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CAPTURED ENEMY AMMUNITION IN OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM AND ITS STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE IN POST-CONFLICT OPERATIONS
From lessons being learned during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), senior US civilian and military leaders must improve future military planning and operations for securing captured enemy ammunition (CEA). This paper will illustrate how the failure to identify and subsequently plan for securing CEA in post-invasion Iraq adversely affected the US' achievement of its strategic goals of winning the "hearts and minds" of the Iraqi people and establishing Iraq as a stable democratic state. This paper will conclude with recommendations to improve current military strategy for handling captured enemy ammunition and preventing it from falling into the wrong hands in future operations. phase. Senator Kerry along with other opponents of the Bush administration alleged that the missing explosives were looted and that the looting could have been prevented if the Pentagon had planned better. Senator Kerry asserted that had there been adequate US soldiers deployed in readiness to safeguard critical storage sites after the "major combat" operations in Iraq, the looting of weapons and ammunition storage sites could have been kept to a minimum.
BACKGROUND
Instead the looting provided Iraqi insurgents with the means to carry out massive and deadly attacks against coalition forces. "there is more ammunition in Iraq than anyplace I've ever been in my life, and it's not securable.
I wish I could tell you that we had it all under control. We don't. There are certainly not enough forces anywhere to guard the ammunition in Iraq." 6 Iraq was so awash in CEA that coalition forces were overwhelmed with trying to secure ammunition sites. Several of the storage depots were miles long and contained hundreds of storage magazines. In most instances, coalition forces bypassed ammunition sites without trying to establish even a minimum cursory security element. Looting became rampant because ammunition sites were inadequately guarded. people died mainly from terrorist bombing on voters and polling places. Voter turnout was better than many people expected but no one would disagree that more Iraqis would have voted had security not been a concern.
CEA'S IMPACT ON RESOURCES
Coalition leadership realized that CEA posed a significant problem in several aspects.
They realized early on that CEA was being pilfered and used against coalition forces. They also recognized that ammunition with its inherent explosive hazards posed an "environmental" force protection threat to the general safety of their soldiers and especially to the Iraqi populace.
The CEA collection effort began shortly after the fall of Baghdad. Initial focus was on caches encountered by units as they maneuvered, which the units and their supporting Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) teams were "blowing in place" as they were encountered.
Military leadership soon began to realize that securing and disposal of CEA was going to be a significant resource intensive long-term mission. As major combat operations ended and units 18 The contractors were given a scope of work comprising four tasks that essentially were CJTF-7's end state for CEA within the Iraqi theater:
• Military munitions removed from caches and consolidated.
• Munitions and munitions storage areas are secured to avoid pilfering for profit or guerilla use.
• Unserviceable and excess ammunition destroyed.
• Munitions for the New Iraqi Army (NIA) stored and secured in appropriate facilities
As of December 2004, contractors were operating at six sites employing 563 US personnel and over 1,470 Iraqis as laborers and security guards. Contractors had secured over 163,000 ST in depots and disposed of over 158,000 ST. The military still had responsibility for providing convoy security and for the identification and reporting of found CEA caches During the initial months of the invasion, coalition units tried to dispose of caches as they encountered them. Operationally this made sense and was encouraged by unit leadership.
However few units were trained in CEA demolition disposal operations. Demolition training for engineer units is focused on structural demolitions and obstacle breeching. Combat Arms units are also provided limited demolition training, again focused on demolition of structures and obstacles. Only EOD units are specifically trained to render safe and dispose of foreign ammunition. Many caches destroyed by U.S military units ended up producing a bigger problem by scattering the contents with the munitions "kick-outs" having been subjected to an explosion, now possibly more unsafe.
Some engineer units thought that blowing bunkers full of ammunition by pouring diesel on the floor and setting it on fire, would cause ammo inside to detonate and fully destroy it. Using their tactics of "blow and go" they didn't return until later to discover it didn't work. All they had done was scatter munitions everywhere. We assisted in cleaning up some areas, removing much-needed EOD assets from the fight, but Engineers continue to do the same thing, and used EOD forces to clean up the mess. 19 There was even an incident where a Cobra helicopter wanting to deny ammunition from falling into the hands of insurgents fired rockets into a bunker filled with ammunition. When the bunker exploded it fragged the helicopter forcing it to crash land. EOD units whose first priority was rendering safe IEDs and unexploded ordnance (UXO) could not keep up with the CEA workload. This caused combat arms units, especially the engineers to take on the task of collecting, securing, and sometimes destroying CEA caches. 20 The 3rd Infantry Division's After Action Review (AAR) for OIF stated:
Though not specifically trained in UXO destruction procedures, combat engineers were critical to the removal and destruction of UXO and weapons caches. Units could not bypass the caches for fear of allowing enemy forces to back and police up the weapons to use against us. Nor could they afford to put guards on the caches until an EOD team could make it to the site. Although combat engineers supplementing and augmenting EOD was an essential expedient, this tactic presented considerable safety concerns. More than once, engineers trying to destroy weapons and ammunition ended up not using enough demolitions or placing it incorrectly.
21
EOD units were in short supply because adequate numbers were not on the Time Phased Force Deployment List (TPFDL) to deploy early into the fight.
CEA'S IMPACT ON CIVIL MILITARY OPERATIONS
One week after Baghdad fell into the hands of US troops, at least 14 civilians were killed 
INTELLIGENCE AND PHASE IV PLANNING

INTELLIGENCE
Planning for OIF did not adequately take into consideration the vast amounts of CEA and its subsequent use by insurgents to fashion IEDs from it, or the logistical efforts that would be required in collecting, securing, and disposing of CEA. Did US military planners know how much ammunition was in Iraq before they invaded? In hindsight the answer is yes. The exact quantity could not be precisely ascertained but a rough estimation could have been made.
In April 1991, after Operation Desert Storm, the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) and later in 1999, the United Nations Monitoring and Verification Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) were created through United Nations Security Council mandates to operate a monitoring and verification system to ensure Iraq dismantled its WMD programs and was prevented in clandestinely developing WMD. To verify Iraq's WMD program, UNMOVIC alone conducted over 400 inspections covering more than 300 sites many of which were ammunition storage sites. 24 
EOD STAFF OFFICERS ON PLANNING STAFFS
The amount and sophistication of IEDs along with the abundance of CEA encountered during OIF has been unprecedented in the history of warfare and therefore military planners and intelligence analyst simply did not sufficiently consider it as a factor in pre-war planning. 
GLOSSARY
Cache: A temporary weapons and or ammunition storage area used for prepositioning ammunition for combat operations or as a hiding place used by insurgents/terrorist for ammunition and weapons. CJTF-7 never formally defined the parameter of a cache. In Operation Iraqi Freedom, a cache could be a few rounds of ammunition or it could be thousands of weapons and ammunition in a permanently built ammunition storage area. This resulted in confusion in reporting, establishing priorities of effort, and assigning responsibility for operations.
CEA: (Captured Enemy Ammunition) Enemy ammunition that has not been used during a conflict and has been captured left behind unprotected or dumped by a party to an armed conflict. CEA is usually standard military ammunition that is in a safe, unfired condition. CEA may or may not have been primed, fuzed, or otherwise prepared for use.
IED: (Improvised Explosive Device) A nonstandard explosive device fabricated from common materials, designed to kill, destroy or harass. It may incorporate standard or nonstandard explosives, captured enemy ammunition (CEA), or pyrotechnic chemicals. IEDs vary in size, shape, material and construction. IEDs can range from simple mechanical devices to complex electronic and radio controlled (R/C) command detonated devices. IED construction is limited only by the materials available and the bomber's skill and imagination.
Partially Secured: Defined by CJTF-7 as it pertained to security measures applied to ammunition and weapon caches and standard storage areas. A cache or storage area that was partially secured had periodic patrols or surveillance or was fenced or bermed.
UXO: (Unexploded Ordnance) Standard military explosive ammunition which has been fuzed, dropped, launched, projected, fired, thrown or placed, but remains unexploded because of malfunction. Essentially ammunition that has been used in a weapon system but failed to function as designed. Usually synonymous with "dud."
